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IV. THE MORE DESIRABLE COMMERCIAL CONDUCT CREATING THE
SUBSTANTIVE ADVANTAGES
Now we deal with the facts which create the status of the holder
in due course. These extrinsic or background facts, when incidental
to an approved transfer of the instrument to a holder, give the transferee
the status of a holder in due course with the more attractive substantive
advantages of such a status. The tenor of these extrinsic facts is that
the transaction be one of the highest commercial morality, one so far
superior to the ordinary run of bills and notes transactions as to be
entitled to a relatively greater reward.
This reward of substantive advantages is held out primarily to
encourage the happening of these extrinsic facts which serve to make
the transaction of the highest commercial order. But, incidentally, these
rewards have, as do the lesser procedural advantages, the further pur-
poses of encouraging the occurrence of transactions which otherwise
might not be entered into at all and of fostering execution of transac-
tions, which might otherwise take place informally, in the formal
manner of bills and notes. Thus it is that the determination of what
are the operative facts leading to the substantive advantages cannot
always be made solely on the basis of what is the highest type commer-
cial conduct but, occasionally, must be determined on a basis of fostering
the happening of formal type transactions. Thus we shall see that both
the rule that an antecedent debt is value and the rule that one may be a
holder in due course even when he takes under suspicious circumstances
not amounting to bad faith effect a compromise between the policy of
fostering the highest type of commercial transaction and that of encour-
aging the circulation of negotiable paper generally.
A point which cannot be emphasized too strongly is that it is not
necessary in all cases to determine whether the holder is a holder in due
course. Only when there is a personal defense to liability or a claim of
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ownership of the instrument does it become necessary to solve the
problem of the status of the holder under the operative facts presently
to be discussed. If there is neither personal defense nor claim of owner-
ship, the holder will prevail simply as an ordinary holder. If there is a
real defense or claim, he will lose, even though he be a holder in due
course.
As we have seen, the substantive advantages are held out in pur-
suance of a vague principle found sporadically throughout the law that
the bona fide purchaser who has changed his position in reliance on the
apparent situation wherein the obligor or owner has made the loss pos-
sible should be protected. Thus it is that, the equities being equal, the
loss is thrown on the one who made it possible. Thus the two legalistic
elements of the operative facts making for a holding in due course
would be change of position and ignorance of. the defect in the trans-
action. When these are combined with the law merchant policy of
fostering commercial transactions of both high and low morality we get
the three basic elements of a holding in due course, i. e., value, good
faith and absence of notice, and purchase before maturity.
To be a holder in due course one must already be an ordinary
holder.228  If a necessary signature be lacking or be forged, or if the
instrument does not measure up in form to the slighter standard
required in order that the procedural advantages be used in enforcing
it, then the person in possession is not even an ordinary holder and
cannot aspire to be a holder in due course.
The problem arises chiefly in determining whether the payee can
be a holder in due course and has largely been settled in favor of such a
possibility. The status of the holder in this connection is rarely in issue
as it is infrequent that there exists a personal defense or claim of owner-
ship of which the payee is ignorant or with which he lacks connection
in such a manner as to make good faith on his part possible. But to the
extent to which it can be a problem-principally in the situation involv-
ing breach of some collateral agreement between the principal debtor
and his surety on the instrument-it is commercially desirable to extend
to the payee the substantive advantages, for in this way payees will be
encouraged to perform the commercially desirable conduct of lending
money on the faith of promissory notes.
A. Purchase for Value
As we have seen, the principal purpose of the whole law of bills
and notes is to foster the exchange of money and the sale of goods by
228. Contrast the position of one holding under NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW,
§ 49. In the ensuing footnotes the various sections of the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law will be referred to merely by section number.
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providing substitutes for money and instruments of credit. This policy
is seen to have unusual emphasis in its application to the instant topic
of the value 229 furnished by the holder at the time of his taking which,
other things being equal, makes him a holder in due course; for to be
a holder in due course, the holder must, among other things, have some-
time transferred some money or furnished some goods, services, or
other consideration on the credit of the instrument which he has
taken.
23 0
But it is not necessary that the one taking the instrument allegedly
as holder in due course shall actually advance the money or sell the
goods on credit at the time of his taking. The rule that the taking of
an instrument in satisfaction of an antecedent debt constitutes the taker
a holder for value 231 is a recognition of the commercial desirability of
the further extension of credit in a transaction where the money has
once been lent or goods sold or services rendered on credit. Despite the
fact that no new value is surrendered, a further credit transaction is
actually entered into when a negotiable instrument is taken for an ante-
cedent debt, and the law's policy of encouraging credit transactions
carried out.
The rule that an antecedent debt is value represents a compromise
of several considerations involving commercial expediency. Were the
emphasis entirely on fostering only the highest type of commercial
transaction, the rule might well be that the advancement of new value
is necessary. So it would be if the emphasis were entirely on "change
of position". It is probable that, in most cases, he who has taken for
an antecedent debt has not changed his position, i. e., could as well
pursue his remedy on the antecedent debt were he denied recovery on
the instrument as a holder in due course.2 3 2 To be sure, there might be
some instances where, because of reliance on the instrument, the creditor
has postponed collection of the debt and thereby let slip an opportunity
which once existed to avail himself of assets of the debtor now squan-
dered. But because it would be impracticable to pursue a subjective
investigation in every case into whether the holder had changed his
position on the antecedent debt, the rule of the case law and the Statute
takes the position that, as he might have so changed his position and
thus performed the commercially desirable act of transferring negotiable
paper, the transferee for an antecedent debt should be considered a
holder for value.
229. §§ 52 (3), 19.
23o. Cf. §§6 (2), 24.
231. § 25.
232. Of course, from the technical standpoint, there is a "detriment" in that the
bringing of an action on the claim has been postponed.
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Further, in order to encourage the commercially desirable use of
negotiable instruments as collateral security for loans, the Statute rec-
ognizes 233 that one who holds by way of pledge may be a holder for
value, even where the pledge is for an antecedent debt, although, to be
sure, only to the extent of the amount of his lien. While the pledge of
an instrument is, perhaps, a less desirable transaction than its sale out-
right, yet by the pledge the ultimate purpose of the law of bills and notes
to foster the extension of credit has been served and, to the extent
necessary to protect the one who has extended the credit, i. e., to the
extent of his lien, he is given the status of holder in due course.
While the Statute, by virtue of its rule that value includes any con-
sideration sufficient to support a simple contract, 234 apparently recog-
nizes a promise or other executory matter as value, it qualifies this rule
by a further provision 235 that a transferee who receives notice of any
defect before he has given all of the agreed value is a holder in due
course only to the extent of that which he had previously performed.
This, too, serves the basic purpose of the law of bills and notes by
encouraging those who have promised the exchange of money or the
sale of goods on credit to hasten the performance of such promises, on
penalty of receiving notice of defects before they are performed. Until
the promise is performed there is no exchange of money or extension of
credit and if such exchange or extension should occur after notice
received, the promise has not then been performed under the highly
desirable circumstances which must surround the transaction in order
that it be entitled to the substantive advantages of a holding in due
course.
This doctrine of pro tanto holding in due course where executory
value is not fully performed before notice is received is involved in two
typical commercial situations where holding in due course is at stake.
The first is that of the transfer of a negotiable instrument to a holder
who gives as value his own negotiable instrument and then receives
notice of the defect in the instrument he has taken in time to stop or
refuse the payment of the instrument he has given. The second is that
of the transfer of the instrument to a bank in exchange for deposit
credit, where the bank receives notice of the defect in time to debit the
account of the depositor for the sum credited in exchange for the instru-
ment. The courts seem to have reached diametrically opposite results
on these problems, although, as a matter of strict legal logic, both
involve executory value not fully performed at the time notice has been
233. §27.
234. §25.
235. § 54.
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received. Then, too, as a matter of commercial expediency, the prob-
lems are similar.
In the case of negotiable paper as itself value for the transfer of
other negotiable paper (where the holder must hold in due course in
order to recover) the conclusion seems to be that negotiable paper is to
be treated as executed value from the start and that the taker of the
defective paper is not required to attempt to stop payment or to refuse
payment on his own paper, as the case may be. There is not even
required a showing that such taker is himself liable to a holder in due
course of his paper, The difficulty and embarrassment of stopping or
refusing payment, even as to an ordinary holder, and the possibility that
the paper has gotten or will get to a holder in due course, militate in
favor of the commercially desirable rule that negotiable paper given
for other paper is itself executed value, the performance of which need
not be suspended merely because of the receipt of notice of the defect
in the instrument taken. In view of the numerous rules treating nego-
tiable instruments differently from common-law contracts, it would,
indeed, be paradoxical for the law of bills and notes to consider the
giving of one of its own instruments as nothing more than an unper-
formed simple promise. To treat both parties to an exchange of
negotiable instruments as holders for value does tend to foster the free
circulation of such paper.
On the other hand, in the deposit credit situation, the rule seems
to be to the contrary and the courts have treated the promising of the
honoring of checks against a bank account as an executory simple
promise, which must be performed before notice is received. They
require either that the specific item must have been checked out, by the
"first in, first out" rule, or, more strictly, that the intervening balance
must have gone below the amount of the defective item before the bank
will be considered (even pro tanto) a holder for value. It would seem
that the other rule that the bank is a holder for value as soon as it has
granted unconditional deposit credit, i. e., has promised to honor checks
against the item, more closely accords with commercial desirability and
is, in addition, analogous to the rule for commercial paper. Business
expediency seems to demand that a bank be not required to debit a
customer's account, thereby running the risk of turning down his checks
and embarrassing both him and the bank, just because some vague
fact which a court might construe as notice comes within its purview.
If the maker, drawer, acceptor, or indorser of negotiable paper is not
required to stop or refuse payment when he could, why should a bank
be required to "stop payment" on its customers' checks by debiting an
item of deposit credit? It would seem that commercial expediency
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should indicate that both the giving of negotiable paper and the granting
of unconditional deposit credit should be treated as executed value.
B. Purchase in Good Faith and Withoit Notice
This category of the operative facts of holding in due course
includes the residual bulk of the problems of the more desirable com-
mercial conduct which is entitled to the higher rewards of the sub-
stantive advantages of holding in due course. Where the preceding
topic was concerned with the unitary problem of the value invested by
the one claiming as a holder in due course, and where the following one
will deal with the requirement that the investment be in a future obliga-
tion, the current topic serves as a "catch-all" for the subsidiary points
dealing with the "commercial morality" aspect of the transaction set up
as entitling the one concerned to the higher status of the substantive
advantages.
And yet, while the law is here concerned with the intrinsic honesty
of the transaction by which the alleged holder in due course took, it has
deliberately refrained from requiring of the taker, in order that he be
such a holder, too high a standard of conduct. Holding in due course
will not be defeated if the holder took under suspicious circumstances
giving "constructive notice", unless these circumstances are sufficient
either to give the taker "actual knowledge" or to make his taking one
in "bad faith".236  This rule must be rationalized as a compromise
between the desire to promote commercial transactions of the utmost
honesty and the desire to have the transactions take place in the first
instance. Setting the test too high (by allowing suspicious circum-
stances to defeat holding in due course, rather than be merely evidence
of bad faith) might tend to discourage persons from dealing in nego-
tiable paper. So it is that persons expecting to secure the substantive
advantages run only the risk of having their bad faith in the matter
shown, rather than that of there being constructive notice through sus-
picious circumstances. The analogy is to the law of sales, which toler-
ates a certain amount of "puffing" of his wares on the part of the seller,
without his incurring liability for warranty of quality.
The specific rules which are concerned with this element of the
operative facts of holding in due course fall into two classes, in that
they are concerned respectively with facts coming to the knowledge of
the holder from the appearance of the instrument and facts coming to
his knowledge extrinsically. The emphasis is, of course, on facts com-
ing to the knowledge of the holder at the time of taking, for whether
the problem be one of "actual knowledge" or "bad faith", both are
236. §§ 52 (3), 52 (4), 56.
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concerned with the significance of facts occurring within the knowledge
of the holder before and at the time of taking.
In the first group, dealing with facts coming to the knowledge of
the taker from the four corners of the instrument, there is, first, the
statutory rule 237 that the instrument must be complete and regular on
its face at the time of taking. Another section 238 makes immaterial,
however, the lack of a date. A mere statement of the transaction giving
rise to the instrument 239 neither defeats negotiability nor serves to put
the taker on notice that the named consideration had not been per-
formed. Of course, the fact that a signature is appended "per proc"
serves to put the taker on notice of limited authority 240 and a condi-
tional indorsement acts similarly with reference to the non-performance
of the condition. 241 The restrictive indorsement serves at least to put
the taker on notice of the interest sought to be protected by the restric-
tion and, certainly as respects the "pay only" and "agency" types, com-
pletely precludes a subsequent holding in due course. Whether the
"trustee" type restrictive indorsement also accomplishes this latter de-
structive effect has been the subject of some dispute under the conflicting
sections of the Statute.
242
The question of what facts extrinsic to the four corners of the
instrument will defeat a holding in due course from the standpoint of
good faith and want of notice is a more flexible one and one calling into
play the "actual knowledge" and "bad faith" tests the Statute has set up
with respect to the taker's awareness of an "infirmity in the instrument
or defect in the title of the person negotiating it".2 43  The Statute
itself 244 recognizes awareness of the obligor's prior refusal as the
equivalent of an awareness of the infirmity or defect in the rule that
the taker must have taken without knowledge of prior dishonor.
Many typical situations have given rise to difficulty under this ele-
ment of good faith and want of notice. Such include the potential
equity problem where it is plausible that, from the knowledge of the
negotiator's use of the value received, the taker should be aware of his
abuse of a trust; the problem of whether knowledge of overdue interest
or instalments is equivalent to knowledge of prior dishonor; and the
question of whether the instrument's being in the possession of one
237. §52 (I).
238. §6 ().
239. §3 (2).
240. §21.
241. §39.
242. § 36, 37, 47. See Smith, The Concept of "Negotiability" as Used in Section
47 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (1929) 7 TEX. L. REV. 520.
243. §§ 52 (4), 56.
244. § 52(2).
8oo UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
apparently not in chain of title is sufficient to preclude a holding in due
course.
C. Purchase Before Maturity
Last of the three major elements of holding in due course is that
of purchase before maturity. The basic theory is that only a transfer
of not yet overdue paper is sufficiently desirable to deserve the substan-
tive advantages. 245 The question, of course, arises as to when the paper
is so overdue as to preclude its being subsequently taken in due course.
In the case of time paper, this is determined by the due date shown on
the face of the instrument. 240  Demand paper, on the other hand, pre-
sents a greater problem. Such paper becomes overdue when negotiated
"an unreasonable length of time after its issue" 24 -- whatever this
means. As to persons whose liability accrues on the instrument after
maturity, it is regarded as demand paper.
24 8
Particularly important is the question of the status of one who
acquires order paper before maturity by transfer without indorsement
and who does not acquire the indorsement until after maturity. Under
the terms of the Statute 249 he cannot be a holder in due course, for it is
provided that when one secures the indorsement to which he is entitled,
the "negotiation takes effect as of the time when the endorsement is
actually made" for purposes of determining whether the transferee is a
holder in due course.
The most interesting question that has arisen in this regard serves
to illuminate the nature of the problem of commercial desirability as
herein applicable. This is whether the post-maturity taker, otherwise a
holder in due course, is subject to both personal defenses and claims of
ownership of the instrument. It is clear that he is subject to personal
defenses, both from the policy of encouraging the highest type trans-
action and from the strict legal logic of the post-maturity-taking factual
set-up. The fact that the paper is in circulation after maturity, unpaid
by the principal obligor, is thought to suggest that, perhaps, the obligor
or some one below him had a defense to liability causing him to refuse
to pay at maturity. Thus, there is "constructive notice" (a doctrine
abandoned by the Statute) of the equity of defense, from the fact of
the instrument's being unpaid and still at large after it should have been
paid.
But does this necessarily indicate the possibility that some other
person has an adverse claim of ownership to the instrument, where
245. Ibid. Cf. § 45.
246. §4. See §§6 (I), II, 12.
247. §§ 53, 193.
248. § 7-end.
249. §49.
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there is no equity of defense? Professor Chafee has argued ably that
it does not,250 although the Statute is apparently contrary to this point
of view. If the emphasis should be on the constructive notice aspect of
the fact of post-maturity circulation, then the post-maturity taker (who
is otherwise a holder in due course) should be immune from claims of
ownership. If, on the other hand, the emphasis is on the policy of
encouraging only the highest type of transaction, then the post-maturity
taker should as well be subject to claims of ownership as personal
defenses. By that view, taking after maturity brands the transaction
as one of the lower level entitled at best only to the procedural advan-
tages.
But Professor Chafee has pointed out 251 that, after all, there is
a policy argument for encouraging the circulation of overdue paper, and
that this should be fostered by granting to such takers at least the
immunity from claims of ownership, even though, obviously, they
should not be immune from personal defenses. After all, if commer-
cial policy is to be the explanation, it must be applied flexibly, and in
this vein the Chafee view seems the correct one. We have already seen
a certain confusion between the policy of encouraging only the highest
type transaction and that of encouraging the simple use of the negoti-
able instrument form in the relaxing of the rules for an antecedent debt
as value and in the proposition that suspicious circumstances, alone, will
not defeat a holding in due course. Granting the post-maturity taker
an immunity from claims of ownership could be justified similarly as a
means of encouraging a transaction of an "in-between" level of com-
mercial desirability by awarding part, but not all, of the substantive
advantages. It would thus seem commercially desirable to have the rule
be that a post-maturity taker may be a holder in due course subject to
the risk of personal defenses to liability.
V. THE COMMERCIAL CONDUCT TERMINATING THE ADVANTAGES
We have been dealing with those operative facts which go to create
the various advantages flowing to the two types of holders of negotiable
instruments, which are extended in pursuance of the policy of stimulat-
ing the greater use of bills and notes and the benefits incidental thereto.
At this point we shall treat of those facts which serve to terminate the
advantages, assuming them once to have been validly created. Just as
the facts serving to create those advantages might create them generally,
or only against certain persons, or in favor of certain persons, so do the
facts tending to terminate the advantages, i. e., to "discharge" or avoid
either the instrument, or the rights and/or liabilities of certain parties,
250. Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper (igI8) 31 HARv. L. REv. 1o4.
251. Id. at 1146-1149.
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serve to terminate them either entirely, or only against certain persons,
or in favor of certain persons.
2 52
There must be distinguished, however, certain factors which at
first might seem to terminate these advantages, yet, in law, do not. One
is the maturity of the instrument. The other is its loss or accidental
destruction. Neither operates to bring to an end the possibility of either
transferring the instrument or proceeding to enforce it by the aid of at
least the procedural advantages. While both preclude a holding in due
course, as we shall see, yet neither precludes the availability of the pro-
cedural advantages. Overdue paper is perfectly capable of being trans-
ferred from one ordinary holder to another with no restraint as far as
the procedural advantages are concerned. 25" An instrument which has
been destroyed, or lost, may still be sued on as a negotiable instrument,
under appropriate local procedure, usually upon the filing of a bond.
254
The only difficulty is a common-law one, namely, that of proving a lost
instrument by secondary evidence. Likewise the right to sue in this
fashion may be transferred by assignment.
Then, as showing that "termination" may only be as to the rights
of certain but not all holders,2 55 it must be pointed out that the various
types of "termination" will not avail if the paper later gets into the
hands of a holder in due course. To be sure, certain types, such as the
intentional mutilation or entire physical destruction of the instrument,
and any event happening after maturity, by nature preclude this pos-
sibility. But, to the limited extent to which a subsequent holding in
due course is possible, all "termination" is but a matter of personal
defense, available against an ordinary holder, but not against a holder
in due course.
2 56
"Termination of advantages" is of three sorts, the classification of
which will provide the topical headings in the ensuing treatment: (A)
termination by the completion of the purpose of the instrument;
(B) Termination by the intentional act of the holder; and, (C) Termi-
nation as a penalty for commercially undesirable conduct.
A. Termination by the Completion of the Purpose of the Instrument
The procedural advantages of an ordinary holder are held out in
order to encourage people to shape transactions involving the payment
of money into the forms approved by commerce and the law. If and
when the actual transaction thus crammed into the mold of the law
252. § 183 (discharge of one bill in a set is a discharge of all).
253. Contrast the discussion supra, circa notes 248 and 249, concerning the extent
to which maturity should preclude a subsequent acquiring of the substantive advantages.
254. Consider § i6o (protest of a lost instrument).
255. § 120 (1.
256. As in § Ii7.
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merchant has come to an end, there is no further policy in favor of
extending the procedural advantages to the piece of paper formerly
representing it. Thus, any activity which has the effect of completing
the purpose of the instrument, viz., by completing the underlying money
transaction, will bring to an end the taker's privilege of availing himself
of the procedural advantages, and, therefore, of the substantive advan-
tages as well. The policy of stimulating the use of commercial paper
needs to be recognized only so long as there exists an underlying
common-law transaction to be represented by the approved commercial
form.
Thus, payment 257 "in due course", viz., at or after maturity to the
holder 25s by or on behalf of the principal debtor 259 or by an accommo-
dated party whatsoever.his capacity,260 "discharges the instrument" as
does the fact of the principal debtor's becoming the holder in his own
right at or after maturity.26 1 These are but legalistic ways of expres-
ing the basic concept of the completion of the purpose of the instrument
by the termination of the underlying transaction giving rise to it.
On the other hand, the indorser (other than an accommodated one
who is really the party ultimately liable in the underlying transaction)
who re-acquires the instrument either by intentional purchase or because
he is forced to pay off on his secondary liability to subsequent parties
does not thereby complete the purpose of the instrument nor terminate
the transaction underlying it and so his act does not terminate the
advantages. Such a re-acquirer may re-negotiate the instrument or
himself choose to pursue the advantages thereof.
262
The problem of payment of the instrument before maturity by the
principal debtor unaccompanied by surrender or destruction of the
instrument is a difficult one. If the instrument be surrendered to the
maker (but not the drawer where there is a third person payee 263) upon
his payment before maturity, he may re-negotiate it,264 as the purpose
of the instrument is not completed until maturity. Thus the procedural
advantages are kept alive. On the other hand, payment before maturity
without surrender or cancellation raises problems under that obscure
section of the Statute which provides that the instrument shall be dis-
257. Consider § 32 (when part paid, instrument may be indorsed as to residue) ;
§ 74 (instrument must be exhibited at demand and surrendered upon payment); § 47
(negotiable character ceases when discharged by payment).
258. §§37 (1), 51, 88.
259. H 119 (I), I2M. Consider also § 175 (payment for honor discharges subse-
quent parties).
26o. H IX9 (2), i2r (2).
261. § II9 (5).
262. 88 5o, 12.
263. § 121.
264. § 50.
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charged by any act sufficient to discharge a simple contract for the pay-
ment of money.
265
Another example of termination through the completion of the
purpose of the instrument is seen in the rule that the holder's procuring
of the certification of a check discharges the drawer and the in-
dorsers.266  The purpose of a check is to enable the holder to procure
money from the bank. If he elects to accept, instead, the bank's obliga-
tion to him, whether a cashier's check or their certification on the orig-
inal check, he terminates the original transaction involving the drawer
and indorsers and, by his accepting and the bank's making the certifi-
cation, uses the same piece of paper for the purpose of creating an
entirely new transaction between the bank and himself.
B. Termination by the Intentional Act of the Holder
Ample legal provision is made for termination of the advantages
independently of the underlying transaction, at the option of the holder
of the instrument. If the one who is entitled to the advantages wishes
to bring to an end his preferred status under the law, the law enables
him to do so. He is empowered to terminate them as to the entire
instrument, as to the liability of individual obligors thereon, or as to his
own rights alone.
Thus the holder's intentional 267 cancellation either of the entire
instrument 26s or of the signature of any party thereon 269 will dis-
charge, respectively, the instrument, or the liability of the party, and
will thereby terminate the advantages either entirely or as against the
party thus discharged. Further, when a holder strikes out a signature
not necessary to his title,27 ° the party whose signature is stricken and
subsequent indorsers are similarly discharged. A re-acquiring indorser
who pays the instrument and who wishes to negotiate further is per-
mitted to strike his own and subsequent indorsements.Y 12 This, of
course, would discharge the persons whose signatures were stricken.
On the other hand another section 272 provides for the case of the re-
acquirer to whom the instrument has been negotiated back, and allows
him to reissue it, with the limitation that he cannot enforce it against
one to whom he was liable.
The holder is allowed to renounce as to any party at any time,
either by a written act, or by the surrender of the instrument to the
:265. § 119 (4).
266. § 88.
267. § 123.
268. § 119 (3).
269. § 120 (2).
270. § 48.
271. § 121.
272. § 5o.
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principal party.278 Renunciation as to the principal debtor at or after
maturity is a discharge of the entire instrument, while renunciation as
to the other parties functions to terminate the procedural advantages
only as to those. Renunciation is only a personal defense and so will
not affect subsequent holders in due course who are unaware of it. The
privilege of the holder to strike out indorsements unnecessary to his
title,274 thereby discharging the parties whose names are stricken and
.those subsequent thereto, is, in effect, a form of renunciation accom-
plishing termination of the procedural advantages.
An unfortunate phrase in the Statute 275 raises the question of
whether the restrictive indorsement of an instrument terminates the pro-
cedural advantages incident thereto. This provides that an instrument
negotiable in origin shall continue negotiable until restrictively indorsed
or discharged by payment or otherwise. This would seem to treat a
restrictive indorsement as the equivalent of discharge so far as termi-
nating the procedural advantages is concerned. There is no doubt that
a restrictive indorsement cuts off negotiability in one sense, in that it
precludes a subsequent bona fide holding, at least as against the restric-
tion for all three types of restrictions. In the case of the "pay only"
and "agency" kinds of restriction, a subsequent bona fide holding is
entirely precluded.276 But does a restrictive endorsement as well cut
off the other aspects of negotiability, viz., free transfer of the procedural
advantages, and the very existence of these advantages? This does not
seem to follow, in view of the fact that other sections' of the Statute 277
in providing what shall constitute restrictive indorsements, and what
shall be the privileges of holders thereunder, seem to grant to those
holding under such an indorsement practically the entire calendar of
privileges peculiar to the procedural advantages of an ordinary holder
of a negotiable instrument. So even if the restrictive indorsement does
purport to terminate the procedural advantages in their own right, it
returns them to life under another name.
C. Termination as a Penalty for Commercially Undesirable Conduct
The procedural advantages are extended in order to encourage the
commercially desirable conduct of dealing in approved types of negoti-
able instruments. Likewise, there is the policy of cutting off these, and
hence the substantive advantages, as a penalty to those who misconduct
themselves in connection with such instruments. This penalty is im-
posed for conduct prejudicial to other parties and running counter to
273. § r22.
274. § 48.
275. § 47.
276. On this, see Smith, supra note 242.
277. §§ 36, 37.
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the spirit of the law of bills and notes, and its ideas of commercial
desirability. Thus presently we shall see three groups of operative facts
which will result in the termination of the procedural advantages, even
though the purpose of the instrument has not been fulfilled and the party
most concerned does not desire such termination. The reason for this
is the desire of the law to discourage certain types of commercially
undesirable conduct on the part of the holder. These types of conduct
are, respectively, the making of an unauthorized change in the physical
appearance of the instrument; the release from liability of, extension of
time to, or rejection of tender from a prior party; and the failure to
protect the interests of secondary parties by performing the commer-
cially desirable conduct of presentment, demand, and notice.
i. Tampering with the Instrument
As a penalty for the commercially undesirable conduct of making
a material alteration of the instrument, 27 8 or of filling in blanks in an
unauthorized manner, 279 or of filling in the wrong date of issue or
acceptance which fixes the due date of the instrument,28 0 the instrument
is said, in the first situation expressly, and in the others by inference,
to be avoided, which means simply that the guilty parties cannot avail
themselves of the procedural advantages in enforcing the instrument.
This avoiding of the instrument prevails only as to ordinary holders,
for later holders in due course may rely on the manner in which the
blanks have been filled in, or the date inserted, and may enforce the
altered instrument according to its original tenor, though to no further
extent.
2. Release of, Extension of Time to, or Rejection of Tender from a
Prior Party
The second type of termination of the various advantages by
commercially undesirable conduct arises when the holder either dis-
charges a prior party, extends privileges to him, or refuses a tender
from him, to the possible prejudice of an intermediate party. When
this happens, the intermediate party is discharged because of the holder's
commercially undesirable conduct. Thus a discharge by the striking of
an unnecessary prior signature not only discharges that party but also
parties between him and the then holder,2 8 - as would any discharge of a
prior party.2 8 2 The release of the principal debtor, or a binding exten-
sion of time on the instrument, also serve to discharge all secondary
278. §§ 123, 124, 125.
279. § 14.
28. §13.
281. §48.
282. § 120 (3).
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parties, unless the right of recourse has been reserved against them, or
unless the secondary party has assented to the extension of time.283
The doubtful provision discharging the instrument, and hence makers
or acceptors, for any act which will discharge a simple contract, 18 4 has
raised a question as to whether extension of time to the actual principal
creditor will as well discharge the surety who occupies the position of
maker or acceptor for accommodation. The holder's rejection of a
tender by a prior party also serves to discharge subsequent parties.
285
All of these situations recognize the commercial undesirability of the
holder's engaging in conduct prejudicial to certain of the parties and
penalize him for so acting by terminating the advantages which, other-
wise, he could exercise against them.
3. Failure to Protect the Interests of Secondary Parties
The last type of termination of advantages because of commer-
cially undesirable conduct consists in the discharge of drawers of
bills 288 and indorsers of all instruments by the failure of the holder to
perform the commercially desirable conduct of prompt presentment of
the instrument for acceptance 287 or payment 288 and of prompt notice
of dishonor 289 by the drawee, acceptor, or maker, as the case may be.290
The policy of thus discharging the secondary parties is, as in all causes
for discharge for commercially undesirable conduct, that such conduct
may react to the prejudice of the parties who are held to be discharged
thereby. As we have seen, among the procedural advantages granted
is the automatic inchoate liability of drawers of bills and of indorsers
of all instruments. 291 This peculiar liability is worked out by the law
of bills and notes in order to give added attractiveness to the instrument
and thereby further to stimulate the circulation of negotiable paper.
There is commercial desirability in extending this peculiar type of lia-
bility, but commercial desirability in this case has a double edge. He
who wishes to avail himself of this unusual type of liability must him-
self perform that commercially desirable conduct which is considered
fair to those who have this unusual type of liability imposed on them.
An effort must be made to collect the instrument from those con-
templated by the law and the parties to be the principal debtors (the
makers, drawees, and acceptors) so that the secondary or surety parties
283. §§ 72o (s), x2o (6).
284. § 119 (4).
285. § 120 (4). Consider also §§ 70, 75, 176.
286. In the case of a check, the drawer is discharged only to the extent of the
actual damage suffered, § z86.
287. §§ 143, 144.
288. §§ 7o, I5r, 186.
289. §89.
Zo. § u8.
291. § 84. Consider also §§ 61, 66-end.
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(the drawers and indorsers) may be saved from the necessity of having
to underwrite the transaction and may be enabled promptly to employ
their own perhaps superior devices for seeking reimbursement from
these primary or principal parties. Thus there is the requirement that,
to charge secondary parties, the holder must make a timely presentment
of the instrument for payment (and likewise for acceptance in advance
of payment if that be required)2 92 failing which, or failing prompt
notice of dishonor if such occurred on presentment, the secondary par-
ties are released from the liability which the law, in pursuance of the
procedural advantages, had tentatively imposed. Performance of these
steps to fix secondary liability (presentment, demand, and notice; or
diligence; or protest, as they are variously called), is thought such com-
mercially desirable conduct that the failure to perform them entails the
penalty of losing the added advantage of the liability of the drawer and
indorsers.
The Statute has designated that conduct which is so commercially
desirable that its absence will cause the discharge of secondary parties.
No such requirement is imposed in order that primary parties be bound,
as they stand to lose nothing by its failure.2 93 It is only because second-
ary or surety parties are put in a possibly worse position by the failure
of the holder to attempt a prompt collection from the primary party or
to notify them promptly of the fruitlessness of such efforts, that sec-
ondary parties are thus discharged. As to them, diligence is commer-
cially desirable because it may be the means of saving them harmless.
As to primary parties, who have no rights of reimbursement, diligence
cannot accomplish any such result and so is not felt to be so commer-
cially desirable as to be necessary as a condition of their liability.
2 9 4
The Statute sets out at great length the details of this matter of
performing the commercially desirable conduct of attempting to collect
from the principal debtor and of notifying the surety or secondary
parties if the effort is fruitless. Presentment of a bill for acceptance in
advance of its being presented for payment is only required in those
situations where commercial desirability demands it, viz., where the bill
explicitly calls for it, where such extra act is necessary to start the run-
ning of the period after sight which fixes the ultimate maturity of the
instrument, and where the bill orders the unusual conduct of paying
elsewhere than at the residence or place of business of the drawee. 23
On the other hand, if an actually unnecessary presentment for accept-
ance in advance of the due date is made, the secondary parties are
292. § 143.
293. § 7o. Consider also §§ 6o, 62.
294. See supra note 284, regarding the different rule for checks.
295. § 143.
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entitled to notice of dishonor at that time, and if it is not given, they
are discharged. 290  Normally, however, presentment for payment, and
notice of dishonor are the typical acts the failure of either of which will
terminate the procedural advantages of the secondary liability of
drawers and indorsers. Provision is made determining by whom 297
and to whom 298 presentment must be made and providing in what cir-
cumstances notice may or must be given in order to avoid the conse-
quences of discharge of secondary parties. Further statutory detail
attempts to work out exactly what constitutes commercially desirable
conduct with reference to the time,209 the place 300 and the manner 301
of making a required presentment or of giving a required notice of
dishonor.
The concept of commercial desirability is recognized in the various
rules excusing or dispensing with presentment and/or notice in certain
events. It is permitted for the parties entitled to these steps to make
express waiver thereof as to one or both.30 2  Certain types of impossi-
bility of accomplishing these steps with proper diligence excuse or post-
pone the necessity of performing them.303 In situations wherein the
party normally entitled to diligence is, by virtue of his dual function in
connection with the instrument, already aware of those things of which
presentment and notice would also inform him, the formality of taking
these steps is dispensed with.304 The commission by the one normally
entitled to these acts of the commercially undesirable conduct of stop-
ping payment,305 of drawing on a fictitious drawee,30 of drawing on
or endorsing for one really serving as accommodation party, for the
former's own convenience, where the secondary party has no right to
expect the drawee or acceptor to honor the order,307 also serve to dis-
pense with the right of a party so acting to notice. Thus one who is
himself guilty of commercially undesirable conduct, is not allowed to
demand the normally commercially desirable conduct from the holder.
Further, defective presentment for acceptance is cured by the drawee's
refusal to accept on some other ground.3 8 And actual dishonor upon a
timely or permitted presentment for acceptance, followed by prompt
296. §§II6, 151.
297. §§ 145, 72 (I), 90 to 94, inclusive.
298. §§ 72 (4), 76 to 78, inclusive, 82 (2), 94, 97 to ioi, inclusive, 145.
299. §§ 7I, 72 (2), 75, 85, 86, 94, 102, 103, 104, 107, 144 to 147, inclusive, 193, 194.
300. §§ 72 (3), 73, 76, 77, 78, 87, 98, 103, 104, IO8. Consider also §§ 6 (3), 46.
301. §§ 74, 95, 96, 105, i06, 136.
302. §§82 (3), 109, 110, i1.
303. §§76, 81, 82 (2), 112, 147, 148. Consider also §§82 (I), 113.
304. §§ IH4 (1), 114 (3), H5 (2).
305. § H14 (5).
306. §§ 114 (2), 148 (1).
307. §§7, 80, 114 (4), H5 (I), H5 (3). Consider also §§82 (2), 730.
308. § 148 (3).
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notice of such will render unnecessary further presentment for payment
and notice of dishonor by non-payment for a bill.309 Specific provision
is made to determine what conduct does constitute that dishonor which
in turn makes notice a necessary item of fixing the liability of secondary
parties.3 10 In the case of a foreign bill, viz., one apparently and actually
drawn and payable in different jurisdictions, the steps of presentment
and notice necessary to fix the liability of secondary parties are required
to be performed in the formal manner called protest, that is, before a
notary public whose certificate thereabout serves as evidence of the
happening of the steps. This formality, which the law demands only in
the case of foreign bills but permits in the case of other bills and all
notes, is required because it is commercially desirable that an accurate
record of the necessary events be preserved. Otherwise it would be
difficult for parties at a great distance from each other to procure proper
evidence of these facts which are necessary to fix liability.311
3o. §§ II6, 151.
310. §§ 83, 84, 133, 136, 142, I48, 149, IO, 188.
311. § i8, 152 to i6o, inclusive.
